

JOHN HAUGELAND

DASEIN

Disclosed

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EDITED BY JOSEPH ROUSE

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Editor's Introduction

John Haugeland, well-known philosopher of mind and cognitive science who taught at the universities of Chicago and Pittsburgh, died unexpectedly in June 2010. This posthumously published volume combines a book manuscript that was incomplete at the time of his death with other published and unpublished papers on the early philosophical work of Martin Heidegger.

Haugeland's groundbreaking reflections on intentionality, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence formed the core of his philosophical work. He had entered philosophy just as digital computing and serious research on artificial intelligence were beginning to reshape the discipline's conceptions of mind and cognition. His books, *Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea* (1985) and *Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind* (1998), and his two edited collections on mind design (1981, 1997), were instrumental in guiding philosophers and many cognitive and computer scientists toward a more mature, reflective understanding and assessment of digital computation's contribution to our self-understanding as thinking beings.

Haugeland's extensive engagement with Heidegger has been much less widely recognized or understood. Roughly once each decade throughout his distinguished career in the heartland of the "analytic" philosophical tradition, Haugeland published a paper that fundamentally challenged familiar readings of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Beginning with "Heidegger on Being a Person" (1982) and continuing through "Dasein's Disclosedness" (1990), "Truth and Finitude" (2000), and "Letting Be" (2007), Haugeland's innovative, iconoclastic work presented a wide-ranging reinterpretation of Heidegger's project and its philosophical significance. His papers stood out for their remarkable clarity and succinctness, their striking and often controversial divergence from familiar readings of many central concepts and claims in Heidegger, and the priority they accorded to philosophical engagement with Heidegger's project over textual exegesis. Along with his teacher, Hubert Dreyfus, Haugeland has contributed to an ongoing transformation of Heidegger's place in contemporary Anglophone philosophy. A generation ago, Heidegger's work marked one of the principal fault lines in sharply divided philosophical allegiances to "analytic" or "continental" philosophical traditions. Heidegger is now more often

recognized as having done work that matters to anyone seriously engaged with contemporary issues in metaphysics or the philosophy of mind, language, or science. Yet the significance of Haugeland's interpretation, for Heideggerian scholarship and even more for contemporary philosophy generally, has yet to be widely assimilated.

One measure of this generational shift has been a change in the style and orientation of philosophical writing about Heidegger in English. For a long time, the primary mode of Anglophone philosophical engagement with Heidegger was textual exegesis in a style that often closely tracked Heidegger's own difficult technical vocabulary. The aim often seemed to be to learn to deploy that vocabulary in place of more familiar philosophical locutions and concerns, and one result was to isolate Heidegger from mainstream philosophical work in the English-speaking world. To work with or on Heidegger was to enter a terminological labyrinth largely disconnected from the primary issues addressed by other twentieth-century philosophers. One indeed cannot understand Heidegger without coming to grips with his often formidable idiom, steeped in etymology, philosophical twists on familiar, everyday German locutions, and sustained efforts to circumvent some of the philosophical commitments built into both ordinary language and technical philosophical terms. Yet Dreyfus and Haugeland helped guide a shift toward philosophical engagement with Heidegger's language and its motivating concerns in ways that have begun to bring Heidegger back into broader contemporary philosophical conversations.

Even in the context of the philosophical and stylistic rapprochement that he helped initiate, Haugeland's writing about Heidegger stands out for its clarity, concision, and force. The same rhetorical sensibility also informs his long-standing effort to rethink the English translations of Heidegger's terms and to work out detailed examples that illuminate as well as exemplify what Heidegger had to say. Haugeland did not altogether eschew strange verbal coinages or unusual turns of phrase, but these occasions now stand out more strikingly against a background of philosophical exposition in remarkably colloquial language. This stylistic achievement was accompanied by a sustained effort to address the issues "with special consideration for readers trained mainly in recent Anglo-American traditions" (below, p. 48). The aim, as Haugeland explicitly noted, was not to domesticate Heidegger or lessen the extent of his challenge to familiar philosophical commitments and concerns but to pose the issues in his thinking in ways that could get an effective and informative grip upon those with different training and philosophical sensitivity.

For more than a decade, Haugeland was writing a book that would advance and complete his career-long philosophical engagement with Heidegger through a comprehensive reinterpretation of *Being and Time* and its contemporaneous lecture courses and articles. Neither the book he intended to write nor the present comprehensive collection of his work on Heidegger is a textual commentary. What we have instead is a thorough reconception of Heidegger's project and its significance for philosophy now; this book is not aimed solely or even primarily at philosophers already interested in Heidegger but rather at the much wider group of philosophers

who have yet to realize how centrally and originally Heidegger addresses their own philosophical concerns. That is why the volume includes several papers that are not directly about Heidegger's work but instead spell out its implications for philosophical analyses of intentionality and meaning.

Haugeland intended the manuscript he was writing under the title *Dasein Disclosed* as a careful philosophical reading of Heidegger's project rather than a commentary on his texts. Although the manuscript is organized thematically roughly in accord with the sequential appearance of central themes in *Being and Time*, Haugeland gave extended attention only to those topics, concepts, phenomenological descriptions, and arguments that figured centrally in his reconstruction of Heidegger's aims and achievements. He treated other themes and passages only in passing. The aim was always a deeper understanding of Heidegger's philosophical import, and not merely exposition. Although Haugeland often engages very closely with specific passages and phenomenological descriptions, in many respects, his primary concerns reorient central aspects of the structure and aim of the book. What guides his reading is a reenvisioning of what Heidegger was doing and how he saw himself doing it.

Stylistically and philosophically, this aspiration is especially important in taking up Heidegger's work. A central theme in Heidegger's thinking is the pervasive tendency of all understanding toward "idle talk" or "bullshit"¹ (merely passing the word along with only a semblance of understanding) and "ambiguity" (obscuring any difference between idle talk and genuine understanding). Haugeland's career-long struggle to understand and articulate Heidegger's project has been a model of resistance to idle talk and ambiguity.

Heidegger is surely among the most influential and informative but also most controversial philosophers of the past century, so one might plausibly think that the appearance of an original, provocative, and carefully developed interpretation of his work needs no further justification. Yet Haugeland's long involvement with Heidegger was never just about the scholarly task of improving the secondary literature on the texts. In his own work, Haugeland repeatedly sought to take stock of the current philosophical situation so as to identify and focus the most exigent current philosophical tasks. Thus, the opening chapters of *Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea* (1985) sought to uncover the historical-conceptual roots of the confluence of modern conceptions of the mind with the technologies of digital computation in ways that could guide a critical assessment of that productive convergence. Papers such as "The Intentionality All-Stars," "Representational Genera," or "Mind Embodied and Embedded" (1998, chapters 7, 9, 10) were written simultaneously as both a reformulation of how others had already posed certain issues and an effort to think past the limits of those prior conceptualizations.

Haugeland was likewise drawn to Heidegger because he saw *Being and Time* as anticipating and responding constructively to current philosophical concerns. His interpretation of Heidegger was thus integral to his contemporaneous philosophical work in his own voice. This introduction is not the place to compare and contrast Haugeland's reading of Heidegger and the positions he developed in *Having Thought* and elsewhere. Yet we do need to consider how and why Haugeland saw a proper understanding and appropriation of Heidegger as enabling a more adequate response to the current philosophical situation.

Haugeland emphasizes Heidegger's aspiration to "raise anew the question of the meaning of being" (SZ 1).² This issue has long served as a barrier to serious thinking about Heidegger within analytic philosophy. Heidegger's "question of being" has been dismissed for several reasons: the early analytic hostility to metaphysics exemplified in Carnap's (1959) famous criticism of Heidegger's lecture "What Is Metaphysics?"; Quine's (1952, ch. 1) tersely dismissive slogan that to be is to be the value of a bound variable;³ and the widespread contemporary turn to naturalism on metaphysical questions. The late twentieth-century rehabilitation of analytic concern with logical and natural necessity, as well as the normativity of meaning, has opened space for a more constructive encounter with Heidegger's question.⁴ Haugeland's reading of Heidegger accords a central role to those modal concepts. Indeed, Haugeland argues that Heidegger's central philosophical distinction—between entities and the being of those entities—is modal: "disclosing the being of entities involves grasping them in terms of a distinction between what is possible and impossible for them" (Haugeland 2000, 53; below, p. 196), whereas discovering entities involves grasping what is or is not actually true of them.⁵ Haugeland takes alethic and normative modalities to be closely connected in Heidegger's work. His original paper on Heidegger, "Heidegger

on Being a Person,” was written amid a prominent reemergence of the metaphysics of normativity within Anglo-American philosophy, in Kripke’s (1982) and McDowell’s (1984) treatment of Wittgenstein on rule following and Brandom’s (1979) reflection on “Freedom and Constraint by Norms,” and was itself an important contributor to the ensuing debates. On Haugeland’s reading, Heidegger’s account of ontological understanding offers a novel way of thinking about what normativity and the various modes or grades of necessity amount to.

The most important intersection between Haugeland’s Heidegger and the contemporary philosophical scene, however, concerns intentionality, that feature of human beings and possibly other “systems” that allow them to be meaningfully and accountably directed beyond themselves. In a recognizable earlier draft of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1979; translation 1985) Heidegger explicitly formulated his philosophy as a phenomenological explication of intentionality, although *Being and Time* avoids the term. What matters is the issue and not the concept or the term, however. In multiple respects, Haugeland’s Heidegger develops a distinctive approach to understanding intentionality, which directly engages with recent analytic philosophy while also moving in some novel and promising directions.

Along with Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, and many other recent Anglo-American philosophers, Heidegger rejected any identification of intentionality with consciousness or inner experience. Heidegger did not deny or explain away the existence of “conscious” phenomena, but he thought that philosophical conceptions of consciousness and experience uncritically unified distinct phenomena while overlooking or excluding indispensable aspects of intentionality. Moreover, he rejected the entire philosophical conception of a division between a meaning-bestowing inner experience and a mindless “external” causal nexus. It would be just as hopeless on Heidegger’s view to try to understand intentionality behavioristically or in reductionist naturalistic terms. Heidegger and Haugeland are hardly alone on the contemporary philosophical scene in taking intentional directedness and its meaningfulness to cross or erase any putative boundary between mind and body or body and world. Heidegger stands out more distinctively, as Haugeland reads him, in how he displays the limitations of biological or social conceptions of intentionality.

Biology, arguably the most successful science of the twentieth century, has seemed to many philosophers today to provide at least a necessary and possibly a sufficient basis for understanding intentional directedness and accountability, thereby demonstrating a fundamental continuity between the intentional life of human beings and other animals. Organisms do comport themselves toward an environment in ways that are answerable via natural selection to the appropriateness of those comportments for maintaining and reproducing themselves. Their dynamic functioning as organisms tracks and responds to relevant features of that environment, and their own continuation as living entities with descendants is dependent upon the appropriateness of their response. Moreover, some animals track and respond to features of their environment in highly flexible and instrumentally rational ways that also change in

response to the outcome of their prior responses. Haugeland nevertheless takes Heidegger to show why such complex, flexible, and subtle responsiveness to an environment is not continuous with genuinely intentional comportment toward entities as such.⁶ Haugeland develops the Heideggerian idea that only an entity whose own being is at issue for it and who is capable of taking responsibility for the truthfulness of its own comportments toward entities is genuinely intentional. This argument is not just about how to use the word “intentional”; rather, it concerns what is essential to our own intentional directedness.

Haugeland’s Heidegger also shows why conformity to social norms cannot ground our understanding of intentional comportments. Haugeland himself originally endorsed a social-conformist conception of intentionality and also attributed such a view to Heidegger (Haugeland 1998, ch. 7; 1982/this volume). Such an approach seems initially promising since conformity to social norms evidently can

make it possible for current behavior and circumstances to incorporate not just “manifest” recognizabilia, but instituted statuses and roles, accrued over time. Social rank and office can be instituted in this way, as well as finer-grained actions, rights, and responsibilities, such as those contingent on whose turn it is, who owns what, which water is holy, or how the teams stand in the league. (Haugeland 1998, 312)

What conformity to socially instituted norms nevertheless cannot do is to allow the entities addressed or incorporated within social practices to be authoritative over how those entities are understood by the practitioners. As I will discuss shortly, this line of argument is central to Haugeland’s reading of division II of *Being and Time* and its importance within Heidegger’s overall project. Moreover, these arguments address many central developments in recent Anglophone philosophy. Thus, in one of the papers included within the final part of this volume, Haugeland argues that, despite their apparent repudiation of traditional divisions between the mind and an “external” world, the well-known arguments of Nelson Goodman (1984) on “grue” and projectibility, W. V. O. Quine (1960) on the indeterminacy of translation, and Saul Kripke (1982) on rule following all exhibit a debilitating “social Cartesianism.” Haugeland argues that these accounts implausibly turn on conceptions of intentional content that overlook our practical involvement with, dependence upon, and accountability to the entities that we encounter in our ordinary dealings with the world.

The import of Haugeland’s Heidegger for philosophical work on intentionality is constructive and not just critical, however. His constructive account begins with the ineliminably modal character of intentional directedness. The very idea of intentionality requires *both* a distinction between entities as they are and entities as they are taken to be *and* a way to understand how the entities can be authoritative so that the way we take the entities to be is beholden to the way the entities are. We can see how difficult it is to understand these two aspects of intentionality together by

noting the frequency with which philosophical accounts succeed in explicating one of these essential components of intentionality only by foreclosing any adequate account of the other.⁷ Haugeland's Heidegger addresses these two aspects of the issue respectively by taking intentionality to require understanding entities in terms of their *possibilities* and being able to recognize and respond appropriately to the possibility that entities might show up in ways that have been ruled out as *impossible*. Intentional directedness thus requires at least an implicit grasp of the differences between what is possible for an entity and what is conceivable and recognizable but impossible. Otherwise, Haugeland argues, the relationship between intentional directedness and its supposed objects might be merely accidental.

Haugeland's Heidegger thereby develops a new understanding of the modality of intentionality in at least four fundamental and interlocking ways. First, the possibility or impossibility of various manifestations of entities is a holistic feature of the intelligibility of an entire domain or "region" of entities (e.g., of physical, biological, mathematical, or other domains of entities) rather than a semantic or metaphysical property of individual sentences, objects, or states of affairs. It is the intelligibility of the entire domain (in Heidegger's terms, an understanding of the being of entities in that region) that constitutes the specific possibilities or impossibilities for entities within that domain. Explicitly articulated laws are partial expressions of those possibilities and impossibilities, and genuine domains are those "totalities" of entities that are rendered intelligible by such interlocking possibilities.⁸ Even in those scientific fields in which the explicit articulation of laws has been of central concern, there is arguably no example of an extensionally complete set of laws for a domain. Any understanding of entities in their possibilities thus commits us to more than we can express explicitly as laws since the laws would acquire necessity only as part of a complete and mutually interdependent set.⁹

The second point about modality is that the modal character of any understanding of entities in their possibilities and impossibilities is normative as well as alethic. Laws¹⁰ do not just describe how things must necessarily be but also demand of us that we refuse to accept any (apparent) violations of them. We must refuse to endorse logical contradictions or natural impossibilities, refuse to engage in or tolerate immoral actions (as violations of moral laws), not accept shoddy workmanship without repairing it or starting over, and so forth.¹¹ Third, the normative authority of such demands that we refuse to accept violations of the laws in a domain comes from us. It derives from our commitments to our own possible ways to be, as human beings who understand ourselves in specific ways (e.g., as thinkers [constituted as such by commitment to logical and broader rational laws], scientific knowers [similarly constituted by empirical laws in a scientific domain], skilled practitioners [constituted by the constitutive skills of a practical domain and its implicit instrumental laws], moral agents [constituted by moral laws], and so forth). How one understands one's own possibilities is thus always at stake in intentionally directing oneself toward entities.

Fourth, and finally, the preceding features of Haugeland's conception of the modality of laws implies that there is something distinctively first-personal about the normativity of the various modalities. This first-personality of intentional comportments does not consist in privileged access to their content or any qualitative immediacy to their manifestation but in a constitutive responsibility we undertake by engaging in those comportments. In taking up various possible ways to be, from science to game playing to friendship to skillful activity, we commit ourselves to be responsive to the constitutive possibilities for the domain of entities disclosed by those forms of conduct: for example, to play chess is (in part) not to tolerate a rook moving on a diagonal, and to carry out physics experiments is (in part) not to accept measurements of particle velocities that exceed the speed of light. A rook moving on a diagonal is forbidden by the laws of chess; a particle moving faster than light is forbidden by the laws of physics. If such things were possible, the entire domains of chess or modern physics, respectively, would be unintelligible. Any responsible individual chess player or physicist must therefore refuse to countenance them on pain of giving up the entire enterprise of chess or physics.

In conventional terms, the central theme in Haugeland's account of Heidegger would thus be objectivity as a constitutive norm for intentional directedness.¹² Haugeland instead introduces the term 'beholdenness' as a more precise replacement for 'objectivity.' He thereby emphasizes the descent of Heidegger's project from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* against the prevailing neo-Kantian emphasis upon epistemology; Heidegger read Kant as developing a regional ontology of the objects understood by Newtonian physics:

The positive outcome of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* lies in what it has contributed towards the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not in a 'theory' of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an *a priori* logic for the subject-matter of that area of Being called 'Nature'. (SZ 10–11)

Yet Heidegger sought to generalize that project to encompass not only a scientific understanding of nature but also any understanding of and comportment toward entities as entities at all. Heidegger argues there is a multiplicity of ways to be that are disclosed by different understandings of being. Where Kant sought to vindicate the objective purport and accountability of empirical science, Heidegger sought to vindicate the beholdenness of any intentional comportment to the entities disclosed through such comportment.¹³ "Beholdenness," then, is Haugeland's revised and expanded replacement for "objectivity"; it indicates the normative accountability of any intentional comportment to the entities disclosed through that comportment's constitutive understanding of being.

It is worth highlighting two further aspects of this account of "objective" beholdenness since each takes up issues that have often been thought to pull in opposing directions. The concept of objectivity emerged in the nineteenth century.

Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2007) have compellingly worked through some of the conceptual history that indicates how objective understanding came to be identified with both the suppression of any affective response to what is understood and the overcoming of any finitely situated “perspective.” Haugeland’s Heidegger stands as a telling critical response to both supposed oppositions to objective understanding.

Consider first the affectivity of genuinely objective understanding. Haugeland had already touched on this theme in his own early suggestion that “the trouble with artificial intelligence is that computers don’t give a damn” (1998, 47). In this book he shows how being affectively disposed¹⁴ toward entities such that they matter to us is integral to Heidegger’s account of the conditions for any truthful beholdenness to entities as they are. People cannot hold themselves responsible for the intelligibility of their comportments toward entities unless they find their possible unintelligibility deeply unsettling and the apparent manifestation of what is impossible intolerable. Only because we are not indifferent to apparent violations of domain-constitutive laws *are* there objective truths and necessities. The objective world is independent of the historical emergence and maintenance of human ways of understanding it, but its *intelligibility* is not thus independent. Understanding entities as entities requires a refusal to accept violations of the laws that constitute the intelligibility of that domain of entities, and such refusal requires that one care about those laws. Who I am (as physicist, chess player, etc.) must be at issue and at stake in understanding entities in ways that I “give a damn” about. Speaking in his own voice, Haugeland takes over Heidegger’s account of “authentic intentionality” as a caring, committed openness that enables our involvement in the world to be responsive to entities as they are rather than a willful imposition upon them.

Haugeland’s second revision of traditional conceptions of objectivity emphasizes the finitude of all intelligibility or, better, its finite transcendence. The predominant general movement of philosophy since the mid-twentieth century has been toward some form of naturalism or historicism. This movement is marked by incredulity toward rationality not bounded by nature or history.¹⁵ Yet a recurrent danger of this trend has been to undercut any normative authority over how we understand the world, such that there would be no intelligible sense in which our ways of life could “misfire” or “get the world wrong.” “Bald” naturalism or historicism (to adopt John McDowell’s 1994 phrase), which unrepentantly rejects any such normative authority, may seem to leave human life and the world bereft of meaning. Yet too many efforts toward a more moderate naturalism or historicism, which would restore our answerability to a world independent of how we take it to be, either fall short or tacitly abandon their commitment to human finitude. Haugeland’s interpretation of Heidegger on the finitude of human understanding matters above all in its promise of a clearer prospect for secure passage between these two characteristic philosophical and existential failings. On Haugeland’s reading, Heidegger shows how we can hold ourselves accountable to entities independent of our conceptions of them without tacitly

presupposing the intelligibility of entities as they “really” are. His account of finitude demolishes the apparent exhaustiveness of two debilitating alternatives for thought and understanding, an impossibly realist grasp of “capital-R Reality” from nowhere and nowhen, on the one hand, and a merely arbitrary imposition of concepts, norms, interests, attitudes, or judgments favored by historically situated persons, communities, or cultures and subject only to norms of internal coherence, on the other. In this respect, Haugeland’s reading brings out all the more clearly how and why Heidegger’s work was so centrally engaged with Kant’s critical project as a reflection on the finitude of human understanding.

Haugeland’s Heidegger thereby radically reconceives what it is to be human. This conception also offers strikingly novel conceptions of sciences and languages and more generally of intentionality as distinctively human phenomena. To see the originality and significance of the view Haugeland finds in Heidegger, consider four alternative ways of thinking about our humanity that dominate contemporary philosophical conceptions of the human. Each presents a different *kind* of entity as the most perspicuous class within which the specificity of our humanity and our capacity for intentionality most tellingly stands out. Within the horizons of these four familiar alternatives, the issue is whether intentionality characterizes us, respectively, as a distinctive kind of physical entity, biological organism, individual,¹⁶ or community.

Haugeland’s reading of Heidegger offers a striking alternative to each of these four familiar conceptions of the philosophical genus of which the human is a species. Heidegger does have a term (‘others’) for individual human beings, but he appropriated the word “dasein”¹⁷ to express a different conception of what kind of entity we are. On Haugeland’s reading, dasein is “a living way of life that incorporates an understanding of being.” Because it refers to a way of life that many persons share, dasein is not individual (one dasein for each person). Yet dasein is also not a community or other kind of social entity, for multiple reasons. First, a “living way of life” includes the world in which it is lived and thus extends beyond the human beings who live it to incorporate everything that contributes to or matters to that way of life.¹⁸ Second, although the way of life is shared by many, it is also crucially individuated: dasein is “in each case mine,” such that this way of life exists in being lived only by persons who find themselves situated within that way of life and are called to take over responsibility for its intelligibility.¹⁹ Third, this distinctive form of normative accountability opens dasein to the possibility of having to confront its own unintelligibility: as a way of life, it is constitutively dependent upon whether other entities (including the other “cases of dasein”²⁰ who participate in that shared way of life) continue to behave and show themselves in the ways they must for that way of life to continue.²¹ Fourth, and finally, a living way of life is temporally extended in a distinctive way. Such a way of life incorporates not merely how people actually live but also how they take up and take over their shared past in living toward a possible future, including the possible collapse of all possibilities intelligible within that way of life. Haugeland’s Heidegger thus presents a conception of human life that is the

antithesis of any relativism that treats human understanding as somehow enclosed within a specific conception of the world. Dasein is constitutively open to and enabling of encounters with entities as utterly recalcitrant to how we take them to be.

It is important that dasein refers only to ways of life that incorporate an understanding of being. Not just any old shared human practice *is* dasein (even though only dasein could engage in such practices). In providing the requisite independent conception of what it is to have an understanding of being, Haugeland's interpretation gives special prominence to Heidegger's insistence that sciences are entities that share dasein's way of being. His account of Heidegger's "existential conception of science" thereby offers a compelling reconceptualization of what a science is, which offers a philosophically important alternative to familiar interpretations of sciences as bodies of knowledge, methodological procedures, practices, social institutions, or contingent histories. Haugeland also calls attention to Heidegger's insistence upon a parallel reconception of what language is, but he did not live to work out that example to a comparable extent.

Haugeland's reading of Heidegger is innovative and controversial. An introduction is not intended to replicate the work done in a book, but it is important to call attention to the book's most distinctive and original accomplishments in relation to more orthodox readings of Heidegger. In what follows, I highlight some of the more provocative interpretations put forward in Haugeland's account. What I find especially striking is how all of these independently controversial claims hang together as a mutually vindicating whole. Moreover, Haugeland's interpretation does not merely address issues that primarily concern Heidegger scholars; his view also significantly changes our understanding of Heidegger's project and how it matters philosophically.

At the center of Haugeland's reading is an insistent focus upon Heidegger's aspiration to reawaken the question of the sense of being. The central project of *Being and Time* is to reawaken this question, which Heidegger argued had long been forgotten or overlooked. Yet too many readers and commentators are then content to let Heidegger's own subsequent discussions guide their conception of how to pose this question and grasp its significance. If philosophy and the sciences have long forgotten this question, trivialized its content, and avoided its existential import, then presumably we need to let Heidegger tell us what it asks and how it might once again grip us. Haugeland proceeds in the opposite direction. Everything Heidegger says must be examined in light of its contribution to posing and addressing the question of the sense of being. Only by getting a grip on this question and its bearing on the more specific topics in *Being and Time* can we adequately get a handle on what Heidegger was offering us in that book. Many of Haugeland's most provocative reinterpretations are guided by his insistent concern to advance our understanding of this issue.

Heidegger's "ontological" concern with the sense of being must be differentiated from most of what contemporary philosophy recognizes as metaphysics. Heidegger distinguishes entities from the being of entities. Entities include anything and everything there is or could be. When Wilfrid Sellars described the diverse subject matter of philosophy as encompassing "not only 'cabbages and kings', but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death" (2007, 369), he was still listing only entities.²² Being is not an entity of any kind even though being is always the being of some entity or other. Indeed, one of Heidegger's central critical concerns has been to avoid a mistaken identification of the being of entities (their intelligibility as entities) with a special kind of entity: minds, transcendental consciousness, meanings, languages, conceptual schemes/frameworks, and so on. Yet although the being of entities strictly speaking "is" not anything at all, there are several important distinctions concerning the being of entities that provide traction for philosophical understanding.

Haugeland makes especially extensive use of the "regional" differentiation of being. Different sorts of entities are differently: whether in some context "there is" or "there is not" an electron, an organism, a person, a tool, a prime number, a chess piece, a ball

or a strike in baseball, or a legal statute turns on very different considerations. By examining how the being question plays out in activities such as chess or scientific inquiry, Haugeland provides illustrative alternatives to Heidegger's own familiar phenomenological descriptions of equipment and "others." Yet the being of entities in each of these domains is also articulated by differences in their ways of being. Most notably, Heidegger differentiates an entity's "that-being" from its "what-being" (a distinction that roughly corresponds to the traditional distinction between its existence and its essence) and both from its "thus-being" in all its other inessential determinations. These two articulations of being (regional and that/what/thus-being) are orthogonal, such that entities in any particular region have their own characteristic mode of existence²³ or nonexistence, as well as their own essential determinations as entities of that kind. Traditional metaphysics only differentiates entities or sorts them into something like regions by way of their essential properties: think of how Descartes distinguishes minds and bodies according to their essential properties of consciousness and extension, respectively. Moreover, that-being has a crucial normative dimension characteristic to its regional articulation. Thus, being-available (*Zuhandensein*) as the "that-being" of equipmental entities is not merely a matter of whether an item of equipment is spatiotemporally extant; equipment has deficient modes of unavailability, marked by Heidegger's distinctions among what is conspicuous (broken), obtrusive (missing), and obstinate (in the way). Organisms have a different characteristic way of being or not being as living or dead. Likewise, *dasein*, the entity whose that-being is existence, can in each case take over responsibility for its existence as owned (*eigentlich*) or can live its life in an undifferentiated or deficient mode that avoids being responsibly. Haugeland emphasizes the normative dimension even to the that-being of those entities (e.g., "protons, planets or prehistoric lizards") whose presence or absence seems utterly independent of human life and understanding:

Until *dasein* releases them, entities remain in the darkest of all prisons, the prison of utter obscurity; we let them out by bringing them to light (into the clearing). (2007, 98; below, p. 173)

Part of what it is for an entity to be is the capacity to show itself under appropriate circumstances.

One revealing consequence of Haugeland's recognition of these articulations of being is to rethink the widely noted contrast between availability and occurrence (*Vorhandensein*) as different ways of that-being. Heidegger does indeed frequently contrast these two ways of being in the course of insisting that available entities are not properly grasped as merely occurrent. Occurrence is the only mode of that-being recognized by traditional metaphysics, and so contrasting availability to occurrence strikingly illustrates Heidegger's recognition of diverse ways of that-being. Yet once that point is recognized, the two concepts do not play parallel roles in Heidegger's

account. Availability and equipmental role (*Bewandtnis*) respectively characterize the that- and what-being of entities in the region of equipment. Occurrence, by contrast, does not belong to any particular region (and is consequently not paired with any characteristic mode of what-being). Haugeland calls explicit attention to this difference:

In addition to these specifically regional concepts, Heidegger also often uses another ontological term, ‘being-occurrent’ (*Vorhandensein*), which is not specific to any region, but is a kind of lowest common denominator. (below, p. 57)

Other commentators have sometimes tried to identify a specific group of entities whose way of being is appropriately understood as being-occurrent, for example, those entities discovered (or properly discovered) through assertions or those entities disclosed by scientific dasein. The former effort confronts the difficulty that assertion plays a role in dasein’s understanding and interpretation of all sorts of entities; while assertion is a derivative mode of interpretation, it thereby serves as an aspect of dasein’s being-in as such rather than as a comportment toward some specific ontological region. The latter alternative has to override any ontological differences between scientific domains. Haugeland is skeptical of such readings of Heidegger or of the sciences. He notes, for example, that Heidegger’s 1929 lecture course *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1995) contained an extensive regional ontology of life (which presumably should govern biological investigation of living entities), and he also notes that Heidegger distinguishes an ontological sense of “world” in which different ontological regions have their own characteristic forms of totality:

A quite different world (though still in this first [nonexistential] sense of the term) is a totality of living things: a world investigated by biology.... Thus, the totality of the physical universe is understood in terms of the unity of space-time, as a dynamic mereological sum of all matter and material forces. The totality and unity of a biological world, by contrast, is intelligible primarily in terms of ecological interactions, forming a relatively self-contained whole of interdependent needs, resources, and “strategies.” (below, pp. 99–100)

Moreover, although the supposed systematic contrast between availability and occurrence is thereby undercut, Haugeland calls attention to a different parallel that plays an important role in division I of *Being and Time*. Heidegger’s phenomenology of the being of equipmental entities in chapter 3 is immediately followed in chapter 4 by a phenomenology of a different kind of intraworldly entity, “others” (individual human beings). Each kind of entity is familiar as salient elements in dasein’s everyday world. Both are clearly differentiated from dasein itself and from one another.